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Abstract
Segregation is widespread in all realms of human society. Several inﬂuential studies
have argued that intolerance is not a prerequisite for a segregated society, and that
segregation can arise even when people generally prefer diversity. We investigated
this paradox experimentally, by letting groups of high-school students play four
diﬀerent real-time interactive games. Incentives for neighbor similarity produced
segregation, but incentives for neighbor dissimilarity and neighborhood diversity
prevented it. The participants continued to move while their game scores were below
optimal, but their individual moves did not consistently take them to the best
alternative position. These small diﬀerences between human and simulated agents
produced diﬀerent segregation patterns than previously predicted, thus challenging
conclusions about segregation arising from these models.
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1 Introduction
Even if people are generally tolerant, they can end up living in a segregated society if they
have weak preferences to be among similar others. This was the counter-intuitive conclu-
sion derived fromSchelling’smodel of segregation [, ], one of themost inﬂuentialmodels
of tipping dynamics and unintended consequences [–]. The most common version of
the model is a simulation in which agents of two diﬀerent colors are placed on a grid. On
each time step of the simulation, the agents move position depending on the color of their
eight nearest neighbors. For example, the agents move if less than % of their neighbors
have the same color as themselves. Even when everyone has these relatively mild prefer-
ences for similar neighbors and no one prefers a segregated local neighborhood, themodel
dynamics result in extreme segregation at the population level.
Subsequent theoretical research has shown that even when individuals actively seek di-
versity, segregation may still be a likely outcome [–]. These models assume that a min-
imum proportion of same-color neighbors is still desirable but above that, the larger the
proportion, the less satisﬁed the agents are and the more likely they are to move. Despite
diversity providing the highest utility, simulations of these models predict a surprisingly
high level of segregation.
When considering questions of public policy, both economists and sociologists have em-
phasized the importance of these modeling results. For example, [] conclude that ‘seg-
regation can emerge. . . even among multiculturalists who actively seek diversity, so long
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as they are also sensitive to small changes in ethnic composition.’ Moreover, [] suggest
that the ‘welfare eﬀect of educating people to have preferences for integration might be
adverse’ because the ‘segregated outcome will be unsatisfying for the majority of people.’
The practical implications are clear: if the theoretical predictions are true, public policies
that promote openness and tolerance are futile because they cannot improve integration.
Despite their importance for policy, the predictions of the segregation models have not
been extensively tested empirically before. Most of the previous work has investigated
what kind of preferences for neighborhood composition individuals from diﬀerent racial
and ethnic groups hold and what level of segregation these preferences produce if plugged
into the models [, –]. The question whether particular preferences indeed cause the
predicted outcomes has received less attention. Answering this question with observa-
tional data is extremely diﬃcult since there are multiple correlated factors that inﬂuence
a person’s moving decision []. For example, in a residential setting, the decision to move
house is aﬀected not only by the ethnic composition of the current and future neighbor-
hood, but also by the household’s income, the price of real estate, proximity to the work-
place, etc. []. In a conference room or a lecture hall, the decision to pick a particular seat
may be inﬂuenced by the characteristics of the seating neighbors but may also have to do
with when one enters the room or one’s personality type [].
The best method to isolate the eﬀect of a behavioral factor is to conduct a controlled
experiment []. So far there has been only one small-scale experimental test of a one-
dimensional version of the Schelling model []. We therefore designed, conducted, and
analyzed an experiment to test the predictions of the two-dimensional segregation model
for four diﬀerent utility functions, representing diﬀerent preferences for local similarity,
diversity, and diﬀerence. For simplicity, we refer to the corresponding games as ‘Same,’ ‘Di-
verse,’ ‘Same andDiverse,’ and ‘Same or Diﬀerent’ (Figure ). The threshold utility function
in the Same game, originally posited by Schelling [, ]models an intrinsic preference to be
among similar others []. The utility function in the Diverse game represents a scenario
where individuals strive for maximum diversity. The utility function in the Same and Di-
verse game represents a preference for similar others up to a certain level combined with
a preference for some diversity. This utility function has practical implications, as it is be-
lieved that while some preference for similar others cannot be eradicated, preference for
diversity can be taught in schools and incentivized through appropriate policies []. Fi-
nally, the Same or Diﬀerent game models a world where individuals prefer either extreme
of full or no diversity. This last utility function is not particularly meaningful in terms of
policy applications, but nevertheless oﬀers insights on the importance of individual in-
centives for solving the problem of segregation.
2 Materials andmethods
The experiments were conducted as part of an interactive demonstration onmathematical
modeling that we presented to high school students. An important novelty of our experi-
mental design is that it was performed in a naturally occurring social environment. Most
game experiments reported in the literature place anonymous subjects in isolated booths
in computer laboratories, do not allow communication, and incentivize performance with
monetary payments. In contrast, we approached an age group that is technology-savvy,
almost universally familiar with computer games, and particularly susceptible to social
inﬂuence. We then used fast and competitive game dynamics and social comparison to
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Figure 1 Utility functions, representative simulation outcomes, and representative experiment
outcomes for the four games. The four columns correspond to the Same game, the Diverse game, the
Same and Diverse game, and the Same or Diﬀerent game. The ﬁrst row shows the utility functions used in the
simulations (and equivalently, the scoring rules in the experiment). The second row shows a typical outcome
in the simulation for a group size of 20. The third row shows the outcomes in one of the experimental groups
with 20 participants. In the simulation, at every time period, one of the 20 agents is selected randomly and
given the opportunity to relocate. The agent evaluates the nearest four available locations in the up, down,
left, and right directions, as well as its current location. If the agent identiﬁes a single strictly best available
location among these, it moves to (or stays at) it; if it identiﬁes multiple best locations, it randomly chooses to
relocate to one of them.
motivate them. Our innovative experimental setup helps reduce research costs; it also en-
ables studying behaviors that are dominated by social incentives.
We conducted the experiments with  high school classes in Sweden. The classes had
between  and  students, providing a total of  participants, aged between  and
. To recruit the classes, we identiﬁed mathematics teachers in three diﬀerent regions of
Sweden (east coast, middle, and west coast) and contacted them with the oﬀer to lead an
hour-long interactive demonstration onmathematicalmodeling of social processes during
one of their class sessions. The experimental sessions were conducted at the beginning of
the demonstrations and introduced as a game without any reference to segregation. Each
participant was given a surf tablet to use as a game controller and assigned a number and a
color for their avatar [Figure S in Additional ﬁle ]. The games were projected on a shared
screen at the front of the classroom [Figure S in Additional ﬁle ].
The games were designed to be as simple, intuitive, and engaging for participants as
possible. They resembled the standard two-dimensional Schelling game [, ] with the
exception that play was in real time, movement was restricted, and global communica-
tion was allowed. The game ﬁeld was a six-by-six square grid. Participants observed and
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played the games in real time. They could move their avatars up, down, left, or right to
the next available empty spot, if such a spot existed. This meant that a participant could
be potentially unable to move if all empty spots were diagonally situated. During the ex-
periment, participants could communicate with each other. Communication was allowed
in order to increase the participants’ engagement and motivation in the game. The data
show that the ability to communicate did not signiﬁcantly de-anonymize participants’ in-
teractions [Figure S in Additional ﬁle ]. We expected that communication would help
resolve the coordination problems in the Same and Diverse, the Diverse, and the Same or
Diﬀerent game. However, as we discuss later, the results we observe are not dictated by
global coordination, as very few groups managed to achieve global coordination.
Participants played four games with scoring rules equivalent to the four utility functions
(Figure (a)-(d)), in randomized order. Participants could observe their current score in
real time throughout the game, but only the score at the end of the game counted. We did
not oﬀer monetary incentives but the games were very dynamic (. moves per second on
average) and caused a lot of excitement and exclamations during game play. We provided
a social incentive to perform well by informing participants in advance that their total
score from the four games would be projected on the screen at the end of the experiment.
Each game was stopped when all participants indicated that they did not want to move
any further, or after  minutes of play.
3 Results
In the Same game, participants produced slightly higher levels of segregation and average
scores than the model predictions (Figures (a), (a)). In  out of the  trials the partici-
pants separated in two distinct groups at either side or corner of the grid (as in Figure (i)).
The Same game was the easiest game for the participants to complete: nearly all groups
converged to the end-game segregation and average scores in less than  seconds of play
[Figure S in Additional ﬁle ]. This was because it quickly became apparent which side
‘belonged’ to which color.
For the Diverse game, the segregation was low and similar to themodel predictions. The
participants continued to move for the entire two minutes of the experiment [Figure S
in Additional ﬁle ] but they eventually achieved the expected high levels of integration
(Figure (b)) and high average scores (Figure (b)).
The experimental results for the Same and Diverse game did not reveal marked lev-
els of segregation, contradicting model predictions. In most cases, participants actually
achieved a good degree of integration (Figure (c)). Yet, their scores were not always lower
than the simulated agents’ scores (Figure (c)). The high level of segregation in the simu-
lation was due to the fact that a small number of agents quickly formed ‘a frontline’ with
an optimal mix of own- and other-color neighbors. The agents not on this front-line then
moved to their own-color side of the borderline, which provided higher utility than the
other-color side (Figure (g)). In contrast, experiment participants achieved a more uni-
form mix (Figure (k)), similar to the pattern in the Diverse game (Figure (j)).
The experimental results for the Same or Diﬀerent game also deviated from the model.
The students tended to have higher levels of segregation (Figure (d)). Further, based on
the average scores, it is clear that the participants did worse in the game than the sim-
ulation agents (Figure (d)). A priori, we expected that the participants would recognize
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Figure 2 The segregation reached at the end of each game in the experiment compared to the
predictions from the simulations. Segregation is measured as the average percent similar neighbors. The
solid circles show the segregation reached by the groups in the experiment and the gray areas show the
proportion of the simulation replications that predicted that particular segregation level for each group size.
In the simulation, agents are situated on a two-dimensional 6 × 6 grid. At every time period, an agent is
selected uniformly at random from the population and given the opportunity to relocate. The agent
evaluates the nearest four available locations in the up, down, left and right directions, as well as its current
location. If the agent identiﬁes a single strictly best available location among these, it moves to (or stays at) it;
if it identiﬁes multiple best locations, it randomly chooses to relocate to one of them. Simulations were run for
100,000 time periods and replicated 1000 times.
that the ‘same’ strategy was much easier to coordinate on and hence, they would con-
verge to high levels of segregation, as they easily did in the Same game. During the ex-
periments, students made repeated references to such a strategy, shouting things like ‘all
the yellows up to the top.’ Four groups attempted to carry out this approach but it took
only one or two contrarians to upset the pattern [Figure SD in Additional ﬁle ]. De-
spite decreasing the scores of their neighbors, these contrarians acted rationally, since
they had all non-same neighbors and thus maximum utility. As a result, no group man-
aged to achieve the simpler one-color-neighborhood solution. The students also made
suggestions about checkerboard solutions like ‘we should alternate. . . blue then yellow’ or
‘we’ll stand in groups of four two of each with one square distance between.’ Three groups
managed to coordinate (or nearly coordinate) to create these more diﬃcult checkerboard
solutions. The rest of the groups failed to get close to a mutually beneﬁcial conﬁguration
within the allotted time.
The vast majority of moves made by the participants were consistent with an attempt to
maximize the utility functions provided to them. Figure  shows the average latency until
amove ismade as a function of neighbor types for the four games.Movement patterns dif-
fered greatly between games, but were consistent across trials within a game. The timing
of the moves reﬂected a strong tendency towards higher scoring conﬁgurations. For ex-
ample, in the Same game individuals with zero same neighbors typically moved after less
than  seconds, while those with  or more same neighbors would remain stationary for
more than  seconds. Themotivation to get high scores was also reﬂected in the students’
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Figure 3 The average score achieved at the end of each game in the experiment compared to the
predictions from the simulations. The solid circles show the average score achieved by the groups in the
experiment and the gray areas show the proportion of the simulation replications that predicted that
particular average score for each group size. In the simulation, agents are situated on a two-dimensional
6 × 6 grid. At every time period, an agent is selected uniformly at random from the population and given the
opportunity to relocate. The agent evaluates the nearest four available locations in the up, down, left and
right directions, as well as its current location. If the agent identiﬁes a single strictly best available location
among these, it moves to (or stays at) it; if it identiﬁes multiple best locations, it randomly chooses to relocate
to one of them. Simulations were run for 100,000 time periods and replicated 1000 times.
discussions and exclamations during gameplay. These were primarily about maximizing
points, and at no time in any of the trials did any of the students make any wider reference
to segregation. Both the actions (in terms of movements made in the game) and verbal
expressions were thus consistent with our assumption that the participants saw the game
in terms of utility maximization.
Although the participants followed the incentives we assigned them, they produced dif-
ferent outcomes than seen in models. Previous research suggests that this could be due to
signiﬁcantly high levels of behavior noise []. Our participants inadvertently committed
errors but the errors were not the driving mechanism. Instead, it appears that the partici-
pants used a strategy that diﬀered from the one implemented in the simulationmodels. In
line with previous work [–], our model assumes the best-response strategy, according
to which individuals change their position only if it increases their utility. This assumption
implies that individuals are able not only to identify better positions but also to recognize
when no better positions exist. However, the participants in our experiment diﬀered in
two important ways from the simulation. Firstly, they were usually unwilling to ‘satisﬁce’:
the participants moved whenever they did not obtain the perfect score. This is evident
from the high mobility in less-than-optimal positions in Figure (b)-(d). Secondly, when
they moved, the participants did not necessarily move to better positions but rather, ap-
peared to choose their new location randomly [Figure S in Additional ﬁle ]. Given the
fast game dynamics, this choice of random directions is probably a consequence of the
cognitive limitations in identifying the optimal locations. Together these two behavioral
rules led to unpredictability and no stable equilibrium arrangement was achieved.
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Figure 4 Average time until next move in the four games as a function of the number of different and
same neighbors. Times are estimated by ﬁrst calculating the total time each neighbor conﬁguration (same,
diﬀerent) is observed over all individuals in all experimental groups. This time is then divided by the number
of occurrences of a move away from that conﬁguration.
The participants’ tendency to make a random move whenever they found themselves
in a sub-optimal position explains the mismatch with the predictions of the best-response
simulationmodel. In the Same game, the participants obtainedmore segregated outcomes
because theywanted to avoid being on the frontier between the twoneighborhoods, as this
made them more vulnerable to other participants’ moves. In the Same and Diverse game,
the participants avoided segregation because they could not be satisﬁed with being at the
periphery of their own-color neighborhood, as these positions entailed lower scores. In
the Same or Diﬀerent game, the participants failed to coordinate on the common-sense
solution based on two groupings of yellow and blue because their scores could be easily
lowered by one individual of the opposite color inﬁltrating a mono-color block.
To further test our explanation for the experimental results, we replicated the simulation
without the best-response assumption. Instead, we assumed random relocation and no
satisﬁcing. In the new model, agents decide to move whenever their utility is less than the
maximum. They then move to one of the nearest four available locations in the up, down,
left and right directions chosen at random. The predictions from this model match the
observed outcomes better, particularly for the Same and Diverse game and the Same or
Diﬀerent game (Figure ).
4 Discussion
Segregation can occur in a whole range of social situations with very diﬀerent time and
spatial scales. Our experiments best capture small-scale rapidly evolving social situations,
such as deciding to whom to talk at a social mingle, choosing a work desk in a ‘no ﬁxed
desk’ oﬃce or classroom environment, and participating in online content communities.
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Figure 5 The segregation reached at the end of each game in the experiment compared to the
predictions from a simulation model without satisﬁcing and with random relocation. Segregation is
measured as the average percent similar neighbors. The solid circles show the segregation reached by the
groups in the experiment and the gray areas show the proportion of the simulation replications that
predicted that particular segregation level for each group size. In the simulation, agents are situated on a
two-dimensional 6 × 6 grid. At every time period, an agent is selected uniformly at random from the
population and given the opportunity to relocate. If the agent does not have the maximum possible score of
100 in its current location, it randomly chooses one of the nearest four available locations in the up, down, left
and right directions and relocates to it. Simulations were run for 100,000 time periods and replicated 1000
times.
In these scenarios, movement between diﬀerent positions can occur on a time scale of
seconds, minutes, or hours. The two behavioral rules our experiment supports are: () in-
dividuals aim to obtain the optimal situation rather than satisﬁcing and () when at a sub-
optimal position, individuals make ‘random’ positional changes in an attempt to increase
their utility. At a social mingle, individuals implementing these rules would frequently
move, continually changing group composition. In such social situations, in the western
world at least, it is plausible that many peoples’ utility function is similar to that for our
Same and Diverse game: individuals value some level of diversity but do not want to be in
a clear minority. Our experimental results and our revised model based on the observed
behavioral rules suggest that even when the participants of a mingle have some preference
for socializing with similar individuals, we would still expect a high level of diversity and
little segregation. Similarly, under the same assumptions, we would not expect high-levels
of segregation within ﬂexible workplace practices or free-seated classrooms.
Residential and work segregation takes place on longer time scales, over wider areas,
and with much larger costs and beneﬁts than in the experiments we have carried out. We
should therefore be careful how we interpret our experimental results in a wider context.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that experiments on humans, even if they do not
perfectly map onto speciﬁc life situations, are likely to be more relevant to policy mak-
ing than simulation results alone. The strong conclusions of [] and [], quoted in the
introduction, that suggest that weak preferences for similar neighbors can produce very
strong segregation, are not supported by our experiment. In the Same and Diverse experi-
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ment, segregation is low and those individuals scoring poorly had inadvertently moved in
to areas with slightly too high concentrations of dissimilar neighbors. On this basis, these
models should not be used as an argument against the need to educate people in the ben-
eﬁts of diversity and we should not conclude that real-world segregation is an unavoidable
consequence of weak preferences.
To ﬁnd out more about the behavioral rules adopted by people moving to a new house,
choosing a new school for their child, or changing their job, a greater understanding is
needed of what information is gathered by individuals. Relocation decisions that are costly
to make may involve more intensive information search, but also involve some degree
of satisﬁcing. Relocation decisions that are easy to implement are likely to be more ex-
ploratory and more common. Humans would often stick to simple heuristic rules or suc-
cumb to biases, even though basic forward-looking reasoning and communication may
allow them to ﬁnd better solutions []. We saw this most clearly in the Same or Diﬀer-
ent game, where we a-priori expected groups to coordinate on the straightforward high-
segregation solution. This never occurred, despite the fact that participants could freely
communicate and in fact, even discussed the potential solution. This observation reminds
us that simpliﬁed models and empirical testing, or, in other words, social science, are still
more valuable for explaining behavior and making predictions than common sense or in-
tuition alone.
The diﬀerences between our experiment and the previous modeling work on segrega-
tion show how aspects of human psychology that are not captured in simpliﬁed simula-
tion models may aﬀect outcomes at the group or society level. The participants in our
experiment behaved rationally in the sense that they acted to maximize their utility. Yet,
the patterns they created were characteristic to humans rather than simulated agents. Be-
cause our experimental games allowed for asynchronous and repeated interactions in a
social setting, they were suﬃciently ﬂexible to reveal these patterns. The results show that
even in a simple setting, humans can act according to the incentives we give them while
simultaneously defying our models of what they will do.
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